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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooooOoooo
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant's Brief
Plaintiff/Appe11ee,
V.

:

ELROY BARLOW,

: Ct. App. No. 920381-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
-

: Priority No. 2
ooooOoooo

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

is conferred

on the court

pursuant

to Rule

26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d)(Supp. 1991), whereby the defendant in a circuit
court criminal action may take an appeal to the court of appeals
from a final order on a misdemeanor offense.

In this case the

Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment

and

conviction for the offense of criminal non-support in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-7-201 (1990).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following

statutes and constitutional

provisions are

attached as addendum A:
United States Constitution amend. V

:

United States Constitution amend. VI
United States Constitution amend. XIV
Utah Code Ann. S 76-7-201 (1990)

J

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. DID THE STATE FAIL TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE CONVICTION?
II. WERE THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO A PRIVATE PRETRIAL MEETING WITH MR. BARLOW AND HIS REVELATION ABOUT DISCUSSIONS
IN THAT MEETING AND HIS REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE IMPROPER?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a conviction on sufficiency of the evidence,
the court should review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). An
appellate court will "reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is

sufficiently

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."

Id. 659 P. 2d at 444.

An

appellant is also required to marshal 1 all the evidence in support
of the verdict and then demonstrate how when viewing the evidence
most favorable to verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support
that finding.

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah Ct. App.

1990) .
An appellate court will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial
misconduct if an appellate can show that
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in
considering in determining its verdict and, if so, under the
circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more
favorable result . . . .

2

State v. Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 49 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct App. 1990)).
Because the trial court is in a better position to determine the
impact of the improper statement
court's

ruling

discretion.

will

not

be

on the proceedings, the trial

overturned

Id.

3

absent

an

abuse

of

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On September

25, 1991, the State of Utah charged Mr.

Barlow with the offense of criminal non-support
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201

(1990).

in violation of

Prior to trial, the court

granted Mr. Barlow's motion in limine to suppress evidence of preinformation child support arrearages.

The court again ruled at

trial that evidence of any pre-trial arrearages was inadmissible.
The case proceeded to trial on March 3, 1992.

Mr. Barlow

stipulated that he was divorced from his ex-wife, Kathleen Barlow,
that he owed child support payments of $300 per month, and that he
made partial child support payments during the nine month charging
period. The state presented no evidence of Mr. Barlow's ability to
work or any evidence of his ability to earn an income.
The state must show that Mr. Barlow intentionally and without
just

cause

failed

to

pay

child

support.

The

state

neither

investigated Mr. Barlow's ability to pay nor presented evidence
demonstrating that he had the ability to pay; therefore, the state
failed

to

prove

reasonable doubt.
1992).

all

of

the

elements

of

the

crime

beyond

a

State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah

The prosecutor

also committed

reversible misconduct

by

disclosing pre-trial comments made by Mr. Barlow during a private
meeting in Mr. Hunt's office.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On September 25, 1991, Mr. Barlow was charged with the

crime of criminal non-support in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-

4

7-201

(1990).

(A copy of the Information

addendum "B").

Mr. Barlow was charged with failing to pay child

support obligations
August, 1991.
2.

is attached hereto as

for an eight

month period from January

to

See Trial Record, 1-3, (hereinafter H R H ) .

Mr. Barlow filed a pre-trial motion in limine to suppress

evidence of prior convictions and prior bad acts.

R. 31-33.

At

the motion hearing held on February 26, 1992, the court ruled that
it "would probably not let . . .

in [evidence of prior non-support

payments and arrearages] in the case in chief, but would allow that
in

for

rebuttal

testifies

purposes

to certain

(hereinafter MTR).
February

28,

if

facts."

Mr.

Barlow

Motion

takes

Transcript

the

stand

and

(2/26/92), 2.

The court, at a second pre-trial hearing on

1992, ruled

that

the

State

could

not

introduce

evidence of Mr. Barlow's prior arrearages as long as Mr. Barlow did
not testify about prior periods where he made timely payments.
Trial Transcript (2/28/92), 5. (hereinafter TR.(2/28/92)) . Despite
the court's rulings the prosecutor attempted to introduce evidence
of "Mr.Bar low's past history of not paying . . . from about 1984 to
1987, where he didn't make adequate payments."
TR. 131 (3/2/92).

TR. 162 (3/2/92),

The court reiterated its prior ruling in holding

that prior evidence of nonpayment "was too prejudicial [under Utal
Rules of Evidence 403 and 404], that it was (sic) nothing to sho1
that it was an ongoing scheme of (sic) behalf of Mr. Barlow not t
pay support

in this particular instance, or any

ongoing—didn 1

show any motive on his part." TR. 3/2/92, 162.
3.

The case originally proceeded to trial on February 2

5

1992-

A jury was seated and sworn, TR. 47 (2/28/92); however, the

court

declared

a mistrial

when one of

the

jurors overheard a

hallway discussion between the prosecutor and Mr. Barlow's ex-wife.
TR. 54 (2/28/92).

The subject matter of the conversation was ruled

inadmissible at trial.

TR. 50-51 (2/28/92).

4. The trial was rescheduled for the following Monday, March
2, 1992.
5.

Before trial both parties stipulated to the following

matters:
(a)

A certified copy of Elroy and Kathleen Barlow's divorce

decree, TR. 48 (3/2/92), see also Plaintiff's exhibit 1 (A copy of
the Decree of Divorce is attached hereto as addendum "C";
(b)

that Mr. Barlow "has two children . • . [and] there's a

$150 child support obligation due on each child each month for a
total of $300."
(c)

TR. 48 (3/2/92);

that Mr. Barlow made no payments in January 1991, a $218

payment in February, no payment in March, $55 in April, $164 in
May, and no payments in June, July, and August. Tr. 51-52 (3/2/92);
see also Plaintiff's Exhibit II, (a copy of plaintiff's exhibit II
is attached as Addendum "D" ); and
(d)

that

circumstances."

Mr.

Barlow's

two

"children

are

in

needy

TR. 53 (3/2/92).

6. The State presented testimony from four witnesses. TR. 4788 (3/2/92).
7.
partial

Two of the witnesses testified that Mr. Barlow made only
payments

during

the

eight
6

month

charging

period,

See

Testimony of Kathleen Barlow,

TR. 47-60

(3/2/92); Testimony of

Leslie Hunter, TR. 61-70 (3/2/92).
8. The other
Barlow.

two witnesses

had

minimal

contact

with

Mr.

One contact consisted of a brief visit with Mr. Barlow;

the other contact was a brief phone call.
Page, TR. 71-74

See Testimony of Kelly

(3/2/92); Testimony of Crystal Larsen, TR. 76-88

(3/2/92).
9.

Kathleen Barlow, Mr. Barlow's ex-wife, testified that two

children were born during the marriage, that the divorce decree
required Mr. Barlow to pay support payments of $300 per month, and
that she had only received partial payments for the period between
January and August, 1991. TR. 48-52 (3/2/92).

Kathleen Barlow had

no contact with Mr. Barlow from January to August, 1991 and instead
received the child support payments directly from the State.
59 (3/2/92).

TR.

She also had no personal knowledge of his ability to

work, earn money, or pay child support during the charging period
because she "[hadn't] even talked with him."

In fact the last time

she had any contact with Mr. Barlow was four years earlier, in
1988, at a court hearing. TR. 59-60

(3/2/92).

The last actual

knowledge she had that Mr. Barlow was employed was in 1984, eight
years prior to trial.

TR. 58, 59.

see also TR. 120

(3/2/92)

(Kathleen Barlow and Mr. Barlow were separated in 1984).
10.

Leslie Hunter, the state's second witness, was employee

by the Utah Attorney General's office as a criminal non-suppor^
agent. TR.

62

"researchCing]

(3/2/92).
the

case

Ms. Hunter
and

responsibilities

filting] the

7

charges

include

against

Mr

Barlow."

TR. 62 (3/2/92).

As part of her investigation Ms. Hunter

"had no knowledge directly from Mr. Barlow" as to why the full
child support payments were not being made.

She admitted, however,

that if a person was "unemployable because of [an] injury . . .
[then the state] would not bother going ahead and expending the
time, effort

and money

on behalf

of

the State to pursue

collection or to pursue the criminal charges."

the

TR. 68-69 (3/2/92).

Her investigation here consisted of "reviewing] the case to see if
[she] feelfs] like it meets criminal non-support standards,"

TR.

62 (3/2/92), reviewing the case with the prosecutor, swearing out
an information, issuing a warrant of arrest, TR. 62 (3/2/92), and
preparing state's exhibit number 2, TR. 62 (3/2/92).

She had no

direct contact with Mr. Barlow and offered no testimony on Mr.
Barlow's

ability

to work, his ability

to earn

income, or his

present income.
11.

Officer Kelly Page arrested Mr. Barlow on September 26,

1991, twenty-six days after the close of the charging period.
observed Mr. Barlow in a shop "working on [a] pickup truck."
73 (3/2/92).

He
TR.

He had no contact with Mr. Barlow from January to

August, 1991. TR. 74 (3/2/92).
12. Crystal Larsen, the State's final witness, was employed as
"an investigative technician for the Office of Recovery Services."
TR. 76 (3/2/92).

Her

investigation

in this case consisted of

calling a business named M & R Enterprises and asking for Elroy
Barlow.

She made

the

telephone

call

on September

13, 1992,

thirteen days after the close of the charging period.

8

TR. 76

(3/2/92).

She further admitted

that as an investigator for the

state she is responsible for putting together evidence for the
state.

TR. 79-80 (3/2/92).

Here, her investigation of the case

began on September 13, 1992, and consisted of one brief phone call
with Mr. Barlow.

TR. 80 (3/2/92).

She neither investigated the

case nor attempted to contact Mr. Barlow during the time period
from January to August, 1991. TR. 80-81 (3/2/92).

Furthermore she

did no investigation into "how much money Mr. Barlow was making."
TR. 83, (3/2/92).

The only information that Ms. Larsen discovered

was that "[alpparently [Mrs. Barlow] owns [a] business . . • [alnd
[Mr. Barlow] helps to run it."
13.

TR. 87 (3/2/92).

Mr. Barlow testified that he was divorced from Kathleen

Barlow, that two children were born as a result of the marriage,
and that he was required to pay a total of $300 in monthly child
support.

TR. 90 (3/2/92).

He also stated that his wife owned a

business known as M & R Enterprises and that he helped work in the
business as a body worker.

TR. 90-91

(3/2/92).

From the time

period between January and August, 1991, Mr. Barlow "tried to work
every

time

(3/2/92).

period—every

space

in

time

[he]

TR.

late

November,

1990,

he

began

TR. 94 (3/2/92).

experiencing

flu-lik<

symptoms which required hospitalization and doctor's care.
(3/2/92).

90

However, since contracting spinal meningitis several

years earlier, his immune system became weakened.
In

could."

TR. 9

On November 21, 1990, he went to the FHP Emergency Car

Center on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City because he was vomitir

9

and having dizzy spells—

TR. 92 (3/2/92).

The original symptoms

"vomiting and intense pain, lack of vision" —

the month of January, 1991.

TR. 95 (3/2/92).

persisted into

He failed to make a

January child support payment because he was "down all month, every
day . . . ,"
.

."

TR.

unable to work, and "[unlable to get out of bed . •
96

recuperate.

(3/2/92).

In

February, Mr.

Barlow

started

He was able to work for part of the month and made a

$218 payment.

TR. 97 (3/2/92).

cellulitis, a swelling
constant I.V.'s.

of

In March, Mr. Barlow contracted

the arms

treated with bed rest

He spent most of the month hooked to an

bottle in an attempt to reduce the swelling in his elbows.
(3/2/92).

to

He made approximately

March, and "was not able to work."

and
I.V.

TR. 98

nine visits to the doctor
TR. 99 (3/2/92).

in

In April, Mr.

Barlow was still recovering from the cellulitis; nonetheless he
made a $55 child support

payment. TR.

101

(3/2/92).

He also

testified that his work in the shop was his only source of income,
and that [e]very month that [he] worked . . . [he] made a payment
or an effort

[to pay]."

TR. 102 (3/2/92).

In July, Mr. Barlow

contracted shingles, a nerve condition that causes the body to
break out.

TR. 104 (3/2/92).

He could not work after contracting

the shingles because he was unable to wear a shirt or clothes.

TR

104 (3/2/92).
M

&

R

Enterprises,

Mr.

Barlow's

1

sole

source

of

income,

See also R. 149
(doctor's letter explaining results of
neuropsychological testing). Dr. Currier's letter was introduced
at the time of sentencing and concisely explains the physical and
psychological problems that Mr. Barlow described at trial.

10

operated at a loss and the business was closed in August, 1991. TR.
105, 117-18 (3/2/92) see also TR.102 (3/2/92) (the shop was Mr.
Barlow's sole source of income).

In answer to questions posed by

the prosecutor, Mr. Barlow stated that he owned no vehicles and
that he was unable to "meet [his] other financial obligations. . .
.M TR. 114 (3/2/92).

He also stated that he was evicted from his

premises because he could not afford the rent.

TR. 115 (3/2/92).

ARGUMENT
I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION BECAUSE IT DID NOT PROVE EACH ELEMENT OF THE CRIME
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

A. Summary of Argument
The state failed to present evidence demonstrating that Mr.
Barlow's failure to pay was intentional and without just cause. No
witness proved

that Mr. Barlow had the ability to work, the

resources to pay the full support obligation, or possessed the
ability to earn income. As such the state failed to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Barlow's failure to pay was done
knowingly and without just cause.

On the contrary, the evidence

showed that Mr. Barlow was extremely ill, had little if any assets
to pay child support obligations, and was unable to meet his livim
and other expenses.

B.

The Burden of Proof

11

An accused person has the right

to appear and defend

in

person, to be represented by counsel, and to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
12.

Utah Constitution art. I, S

Those accused of crime have no duty to produce evidence nor

must they testify or give evidence. Id.
element

of

a

crime

rests

with

The burden of proving each

the

state.

United

States

Constitution, Amends. V, VI, XIV; Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12;
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1990)2; In Re Wanship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970); State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 829 (1913) (State must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused "without just
excuse willfully neglected and refused to provide . . ."

for the

support of his children).
A defendant may sometimes be required to bring forward some
evidence of an affirmative defense.3
775, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

See

State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d

However, affirmative defenses in

Utah are identified by statute, see supra note 3, and none of those
defenses are applicable here.

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1990) reads in pertinent part as
follOWS:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to
be innocent until each element of the offense charged
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
3

The Utah Legislature created seven affirmative defenses:
(1) compulsion (§ 76-2-302); (2) entrapment (§76-2-303);
(3)
ignorance or mistake of fact or law (§ 76-2-304); (4) mistake as to
victim's age (§ 76-2-304.5); (5) mental illness (§76-2-305); (6)
voluntary intoxication (§76-2-306); (7) voluntary termination of
efforts (§ 76-2-307).

12

C.

Sufficiency of the Evidence
When reviewing a case on sufficiency of evidence grounds an

appellate

court

will

"review

favorable to the jury verdict ."
(Utah 1985).
evidence

the

evidence

in

the

light

most

State v. Booker, 709 P. 2d 342, 345

The court will "reverse a jury verdict only if 'the

. . .

is [so] sufficiently

inconclusive or inherently

improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt

that

the defendant

convicted.1"
State v.

committed

the crime of which he was

State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting

Petree,

659

P.2d

443, 444

(Utah

prosecutor presents only circumstantial

1983)).

evidence

When

the

it must be of

"such quality or quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."

Span, 819 P.2d at 332 (quoting State

v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)).
An

appellate

challenging

the

sufficiency

of

evidence

in

support of a conviction must also "marshal 1 the evidence in support
of

the trial

court's

findings and

then demonstrate

that

even

viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient

to support

the findings."

State v.

Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

D.

The Elements of Criminal Non-Support
The Utah criminal non-support statute4 requires the state t
*

Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) reads as follows:

( D A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spou*
or children under the age of sixteen years, he knowingly a1
without just cause fails to provide for the support of the spou

13

prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That Mr. Barlow has children under sixteen years of age;5
(2)
That Mr. Barlow knowingly failed to provide for the
children's support;
(3) That Mr. Barlow's failure to provide support was without
just cause; and
(4) That Mr. Barlow's children were in needy circumstances. 6

E. Knowledge and Without Just Cause
Utah's criminal non-support statute excuses those persons, who
with just cause cannot pay their child support obligations.

Bess,

137 P. at 832; See also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672
(1983) (an accused who cannot "make sufficient bona fide efforts to
legally require resources to pay

[a fine or restitution]. . ."

cannot be incarcerated).
In considering whether a defendant's failure to pay

child

support was without just cause other jurisdictions have held that
the state must show that the accused had the ability to work and
the resources to pay.

State v. Nelson, 463 S.W. 2d 614, 617 (Mo.

App. 1971) (evidence insufficient to support conviction when state
or children when either is in needy circumstances.
5

Mr. Barlow conceded this element. TR. 48 (3/2/92).

* Mr. Barlow also conceded this element.
7

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) involved a postconviction revocation hearing where the court had originally
suspended Bearden's sentence upon the condition that he pay a fine.
Bearden, who was indigent, was unable to pay the fine because he
was unable to find a job and had no income or assets. The court
was thus compelled to impose a punishment other than jail. Id- at
672.
14

failed to present evidence to show that the accused was working,
that work was available to him, or that he was physically able to
work); 8 Burris v. State, 382 N.E. 2d 963, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th
Dist. 1978) (state failed to meet

its burden of proof when it

failed to show that accused had a job and was physically able to
work); 9

State v. Johnson, 412 So. 2d 602, 604 (La. 1982)

("an

accused cannot be constitutionally convicted for failing to make
support payments during a period when he did not have the financial
means or ability to provide support."); Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d
1019. 1021 (AK App. 1985) (State is required to show that accused
"either actually had funds available for payment of support or that
he could have obtained such funds through reasonable efforts.").
See also

Ziealer v. Butler, 410 So. 2d 93, 94 (Ala Civ. App. 1982)

(an accused cannot be imprisoned due to an inability to pay child
support when he had no assets, had lost his job and had no money to
pay).
In proving that an accused "knowingly and without just cause"
failed to provide

support, the state must do more than

simply

0

The Missouri Statute in effect at that time is similar to
Utah's present non-support statute and made it a crime for an
accused to "unlawfully and wilfully fail, neglect and refuse to
provide, without good cause, the necessary and proper food,
clothing, maintenance and support for his lawful minor children."
Nelson, 463 S.W.2d 614.
?

The Indiana statute in effect at the time of the Burris
case made it a crime for an accused "who being able either by
reason of having means or by personal services, labor or earnings,
shall wilfully neglect or refuse to provide such child or childrer
with necessary and proper home, care, food and clothing . • . .'
Burris, 382 N.E. 2d at 964 n. 2. The Indiana law was subsequent 1'
amended later in 1978. See Davis v. State, 481 N.E. 2d 434, 43
(Ind. App. 3 Dist. 1985)
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present evidence showing that the payments were not made.
the state must

show "beyond a reasonable doubt

Thus

• . . that the

defendant without just excuse willfully neglected and refused to
provide for [his children's] support and maintenance. . . . "
137 P. at 832.

Bess,

In Bess, the Utah Supreme Court reversed Mr. Bess's

conviction for criminal non-support finding that the state "wholly
failted] to show willfull

neglect.11

In Bess, the

undisputed

evidence showed that the Mr. Bess's expenses exceeded his income,
that he had attempted

to work, and that

he did not waste his

earnings "in dissipation or riotous living." 137 P. at 832.

The

Utah Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, found that Mr.
Bess's income exceeded his income.

Id.-

The court concluded that

the State failed to "establish!!] by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that

. . . [Mr. Bess] with just excuse willfully neglected

and refused to provide for the [support of his children]."

Id.

1U

Utah does not have a prima facie statute like some other
states. See State v. Shaw, 96 Idaho 250, 253 (Idaho 1975) (proof
of neglect to furnish support under Idaho statute is prima facie
evidence that the failure to provide support is wilful); Davis v.
State, 481 N.E. 2d at 435 (inability to pay support is made an
affirmative defense by statute). Rather Utah requires the state to
prove each element and does not equate the mere failure to pay with
a prima facie case. Bess, 137 P. at 832.
11

The criminal non-support statute in effect in 1913 read in
pertinent part as follows:
Any person who shall without just excuse, desert or
willfully neglect or refuse to provide for the support
and maintenance of his or her minor child or children
under the age of sixteen years, in destitute or
necessitous circumstances, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . ."
See Bess, 137 P.2d at 830 (citing Utah Sess. Laws 1911, c. 105, §
1.)
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F. Marshalling the Evidence
The following section is an attempt to marshal 1 the evidence
in support of the lower court's verdict. See Moore, 802 P. 2d at
738. After marshalling the evidence, the remaining paragraphs will
show how the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The first two witnesses for the state, Kathleen Barlow and
Leslie Hunter, both testified that Mr. Barlow made only partial
support payments during the charging period.
Tr. 62-63

(3/2/92).

Kathleen

TR. 51-52 (3/2/92),

Barlow also stated

children were in needy circumstances. TR. 52-54.

that her

two

She knew of no

reason why Mr. Barlow could not provide child support, TR. 56, but
admitted that she had not spoken with Mr. Barlow since 1988. TR.
60.

She concluded that Mr. Barlow was working from January to

August,

1991, but

her

knowledge

inadmissible hearsay. TR. 56-57.

of his

work was ruled

to

be

The last time she personally knew

that Mr. Barlow was working was eight years earlier in 1984, when
the couple was still married. TR. 57.

Her only knowledge of Mr.

Barlow's job skills and ability to work were gleaned during their
marriage in the early 1980's. TR. 57.

In 1984 she knew that Mr.

Barlow was skilled in body and paint work and in car sales. TR. 57.
The state's investigation was conducted by three witnesses.
Leslie Hunter's investigation consisted of "review!ingl the case to
see if [she felt] like it meets criminal non-support standards,"
reviewing

the

information and

case

with

issuing

the

prosecutor,

the warrant
17

swearing

of arrest.

TR.

out
62.

the
She

conducted

no

further

investigation

because

someone

else

was

responsible for monitoring the case from January to August, 1991.
TR. 69 (3/2/92).

She authenticated State's Exhibit No. 2, which

detailed the pattern of Mr. Barlow's support payments in the months
from January

to August,

1991.

stipulated to this evidence.
had no

personal

contact

TR.

63. Mr. Barlow

previously

During the limited investigation she

with

Mr. Barlow

and had

no

personal

knowledge as to any reason why Mr. Barlow failed to pay all of the
required child support.

TR. 65.

She received the file from the

civil division, who do "most of the investigation," and she merely
files

the

criminal

charges

as

if she

criminal nonsupport standards."

TR. 62.

"feelEs]

like

it

meets

Ms. Hunter was familiar with cases where individuals were sick
or injured and unable to work. TR. 68.

When she is aware that

someone is sick or injured she tries to determine "whether or not
[the person is] unemployable because of their injury."

TR. 68. If

a person was sick or injured and unable to work Ms. Hunter would be
unwilling to pursue the criminal charges. Tr. 69.

Here she had no

knowledge of Mr. Barlow's illness.
The second

investigator, Murray

City Police Officer

Page, arrested Mr. Barlow at 4195 South 500 West.

TR. 71.

Kelly
The

arrest occurred on September 26, 1991, twenty-six days after the
close of the charging period.

TR. 72, 74

Inside the building,

Page observed a pickup truck, a compressor that was running, tools,
and an office. TR. 72.

Mr. Barlow was working on the pickup truck

and the shop "did look as though he would be able to work on a
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vehicle

there."

TR.

73-

He offered

no

testimony

as

to Mr.

Barlow's income or ability to earn income from working.
The state's final investigator, Crystal Larsen, called M & R
Enterprises and spoke with a person who identified himself as Elroy
Barlow.

TR. 77. She made the call on September 13, 1991, thirteen

days after the close of the charging period.

TR. 80.

She had no

contact with Mr. Barlow from January to August 1991.

TR. 80-81.

She admitted

that she conducted no investigation

into how much

money Mr.. Barlow made during January or any of the other months.
TR. 84.

Because her role in the investigation was very limited,

she did "not know if [Mr. Barlow] is making a certain amount of
money in a certain amount of months due to whatever reasons."

TR.

85.
Elroy Barlow admitted

that

he was divorced

from

Kathleen

Barlow, that two children were born during the marriage, and that
he was required to pay a total of $300 in monthly child support.
TR. 90 (3/2/92).

His current wife owned a business known as M & R

Enterprises which he helped operate when healthy enough to do so.
TR. 90-91 (3/2/92).
& R Enterprises.

Mr. Barlow's sole source of income was from M

TR. 102. Unfortunately, the business operated at

a loss and was eventually closed in August, 1991. TR. 105, 117-18
(3/2/92).

"Every month [he was able to] work . . . [Mr. Barlow]

made a payment or an effort."

TR. 102 (3/2/92).

From the time period between January and August, 1991, Mr.
Barlow "tried to work every time period—every space in time [he!
could."

TR.

90

(3/2/92).

However,
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since contracting

spinal

meningitis, his immune system became weakened.

TR. 94 (3/2/92).

On November 21, 1990, went to see the doctor at the FHP on
Redwood Road in Salt Lake City.
him

to vomit

and have dizzy

original symptoms —
-

He contracted a flu virus causing
spells.

TR.

92

(3/2/92).12

The

"vomiting and intense pain, lack of vision" -

persisted into the month of January, 1991. TR. 95 (3/2/92).

He

failed to make a January child support payment because he was "down
all month, every day . . . ," unable to work, and "[unlable to get
out of bed . . . ."

TR. 96 (3/2/92).

In February, Mr. Barlow

started to recuperate, was able to work for part of the month, and
made a $218 payment.

TR.

97 (3/2/92).

In March, Mr. Barlow

contracted cellulitis, and spent most of the month hooked to an
I.V. bottle in an attempt to reduce the swelling in his elbows.
TR. 98 (3/2/92).

He made approximately nine visits to the doctor

in March, and "was not able to work."

TR. 99 (3/2/92).

In April,

Mr. Barlow was still recovering from the cellulitis; he nonetheless
made a $55 child support payment. TR. 101 (3/2/92).

In July, Mr.

Barlow contracted Shingles, a nerve condition that causes the body
to

break

out.

TR.

104

(3/2/92).

He

could

not

work

after

contracting the shingles because he was unable to wear a shirt or
clothes.

TR 104 (3/2/92) .

Mr. Barlow owned no vehicles and
other financial obligations.

..."

11

was unable to "meet [his]
TR. 114 (3/2/92).

He was

See also R. 149 9 (doctor's letter explaining results of
neuropsychological testing). Dr. Currier's letter was introduced
at the time of sentencing and concisely explains the physical and
psychological problems that Mr. Barlow described at trial.
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evicted from his homes because he was unable to pay the rent.

TR.

115 (3/2/92).

G. The Evidence is Insufficient to Sustain the Conviction
To prove that the failure to pay child support was "without
just

cause"

the state must

establish

financial ability to pay support.
P.2d at 1021.

that

Mr. Barlow had

the

Bess, 137 P. at 832. Taylor, 710

In Taylor, the Alaska Supreme Court in addressing a

similar question ruled as follows
we interpret "without lawful excuse" to mean that the
state is required to establish, as an element of criminal
nonsupport . . . that the accused had the financial
ability to pay support—that is, that the accused either
actually had funds available for payment of support or
that he could have obtained such funds through reasonable
efforts.
Taylor, 710 P.2d at 1021.
Here, the state

failed to meet

its burden of proof.

It

presented no evidence that Mr. Barlow actually had the financial
resources to pay child support.13

See

Taylor, 710 P. 2d at 1024

(State introduced evidence that defendant earned $42,000 during one
year period encompassing charges); People v. James, 411 N.E. 2d
563, 565

(111. App. 1980)

(evidence of prior years income tax

returns sufficient to show that accused had financial resources to
pay support).

Nor did the state show that he actually had funds

1J

The sole evidence on this point was from Mr. Barlow himself
who stated that his only source of income was from M & R
Enterprises, TR. 102 (3/2/92), that he was unable to meet his other
financial obligations, TR. 114 (3/2/92), that he was unable to work
because of medical problems, TR. 92-110 (3/2/92), and that he made
his best efforts to pay whenever he was healthy enough to work.
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available to make the payments. Id. See State v. Jackson, 485 So.
2d 630, 634 (La. App.
worked

at

full

time

4 Cir. 1986) (State proved that
job, maintained

property). No witness

testified

income,

home,

maintained

a

home, and owned

that Mr.

or

owned

accused
personal

Barlow had a

personal

steady

property.

Furthermore, no investigator visited M & R Enterprises during the
charging period or spoke with Mr. Barlow, during the period when he
was ill.

Finally, there was no evidence to show that Mr.

Barlow could have obtained funds through reasonable efforts. See
Taylor, 710 P.2d 1021.
Enterprises,

a

His sole source of income was from M & R

business

subsequently closed.

that

operated

at

a

loss

and

was

With the limited income he did make, he made

every effort to pay support and indeed made partial payments in
several of the months in question.
The testimony of his ex-wife stating that he was employed
eight years earlier

is insufficient

to support

the conviction.

Burris v. State, 382 N.E. 2d 963, 965 (Ct. App. Ind. 1978) (exwife's

knowledge

that

accused was employed

during marriage

is

insufficient to establish that accused is capable of work eight
years later).

Similarly,

Investigator Larsen's phone call

and

officer Page's arrest of Mr. Barlow both occurred after the period
in which he was charged and that evidence is irrelevant,
966.

(evidence gathered

before

charging

period

relating

id. at
to an

accused's ability to work is irrelevant to the period charged in
the information).
When considering this evidence in the light most favorable to
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the verdict, the state has failed to prove that Mr. Barlow had the
resources or income to pay child support.

See Taylor, 710 P.2d at

1021; Bess, 137 P.2d at 832; Johnson, 412 So. 2d at 604; Burris,
382 N.E. 2d at 967.

In reversing a conviction for the criminal

non-support the Indiana Court of Appeals stated that
There is no evidence as to whether he [the defendant] actually
was working during the period of time covered by the
information, no evidence to prove that work was available to
him, no evidence except the conclusion of complainant, that he
was physically able to work.
Burris, 382 N.E. 2d at 967 (quoting Nelson, 463 S-W. 2d at 617).
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO A PRIVATE PRE-TRIAL
MEETING WITH MR. BARLOW AND HIS REVELATION ABOUT DISCUSSIONS IN
THAT MEETING AND HIS REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
Mr. Barlow testified that none of the people who testified for
the state spoke with him until after the close of the charging
period. TR. 105.

He was then asked the following questions:

Q: [By Mr. Mauro]: You didn't tell anyone from the Attorney
General's Office [about your medical problems]?
A: [By Mr. Barlow]: Yeah. I did.
Q: Who did you tell?
A: Jeff. I told Jeff.
Q: And when you say Jeff, who are you referring to?
A: Well, Jeff Hunt.
Q: When did you—what did you tell Jeff and when did you tell
you tell him about that?
A: Well, h e — h e wanted me to come in, I got papers to come in
and see the Assistant Attorney General, Jeff Hunt.
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Q: And did you do that ?
A: And so I did. I did that.
Q: And did you tell him about your medical problems?
A: Yeah. I told him that I had a real hard time—in that time
there, and that I was un—able to pay, you know, and do you want me
to keep going, and tell what he told me and back and forth.
Q: [by Mr. Mauro] No.
Later, while Mr. Hunt was cross-examining Mr. Barlow he asked
about the pre-trial meeting held in his office:
Q: [By Mr. Hunt]: Now, you—you related to the jury a meeting
that you and I had in my office—
A: [By Mr. Barlow]: Uh huh (affirmative).
Q: — s o m e months ago. And you remember that meeting?
A: Uh huh (affirmative).
Q: Okay. And that was prior to our office filing these charges
in this matter, wasn't it?
A: Right. That's right.
Q: And that was an attempt—
MR. MAURO: Well, your honor. Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q: (By Mr. Hunt) During that meeting, during the course of
that meeting, did I attempt to work o u t —
MR. MAURO: Objection. Could we approach?
THE COURT: Sustained
(Whereupon, an off-record discussion was held at side bar.)
THE COURT: The jury will disregard the last question.
24

TR. 111-112.
Still later during cross-examination, Mr. Hunt inquired into
an area that the court had previously declared inadmissible:
Q: (By Mr. Hunt) Since the filing of this action, have you
attempted to catch up on your—
MR. MAURO: Objection, your honor.
Q: (By Mr. Hunt) —past

support—

MR. MAURO: Relevance
THE COURT: Sustained.
TR. 115 (3/2/92).
Again during closing argument Mr. Hunt revisited the subject
of the private meeting between himself and Mr. Barlow, this time
divulging previously undisclosed communications:
(By Mr. Hunt) Mr. Barlow has told me in the past, before I
filed this matter, that he has been sick and been ill, and he's
testified to that.

And he testified as to a meeting that he had

with me early on, and I — I have known a bit that he has been in the
doctors on occasions in the past.

He's never provided me with any

evidence of such, b u t —
MR. MAURO: Objection, your Honor. Objection.

TR. 149.

The court sustained the objection and admonished the prosecutor:
THE COURT: You can't testify here today. This is argument of
stuff that's been introduced into evidence.
The jury will disregard any testimony that seems to be being
offered by the attorney.
Mr.

Hunt,

please

limit

your
25

argument

to what

has

been

testified to.
TR. 149-50.
The prosecutor, again during the rebuttal stage of closing
argument, discussed

evidence relating

to the pre-trial

meeting

which was not introduced at trial:
[closing argument by Mr. Hunt]:
to what defense

The State has known, contrary

counsel asserts, the State has known that Mr.

Barlow was going to claim that he had been to doctors before.1*
Mr. Barlow himself testified that he met with me prior to this
action.
MR. MAURO: Objection again, your Honor.
MR. HUNT:

He—they opened the door, that draws an objection

the first time, and they opened the door, your Honor.
MR. MAURO: Judge-THE COURT: Well, that was his testimony.

I '11 let you argue

the testimony, Mr. Hunter (sic), but this is only closing argument.
Okay.
MR. HUNT:

I understand.15

14

No state witness mentioned anything about Mr. Barlow seeing
a doctor or having medical problems.
In fact none of State's
witnesses even talked with Mr. Barlow or investigated the case
during the charging period.
15

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial outside the presence
of the jury. The court denied the motion.
TR. 159, 164-166
(3/2/92). The motion for mistrial and court's ruling are attached
as addendum "E." See State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 277, 287
(Utah 1989) (when defendant, at close of penalty phase of trial,
but before jury has returned a sentence, moves for mistrial on
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during penalty
phase, issue of prosecutorial conduct is preserved for appeal).
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A,

Test for Determining Prosecutorial Misconduct
In

determining

whether

a

prosecutor's

improper

statements constitute reversible error Utah courts apply a twoprong test:
[1] did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in considering
in determining their verdict, and [2] were they, under
the circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by the remarks*
E.g., State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).
The courts analyze the first
asking

whether

outside

the

the

prosecutor

evidence."

step in a common sense manner

"calUed]

Troy,

688

attention

P.2d

mentioning that defendant had been involved

at

486

to

matters

(prosecutor

in various criminal

activities and comparing him to John Hinckley were matters outside
the evidence); State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986)
(improper for prosecutor to argue that defendant's prior criminal
conviction demonstrated his criminal character).
Applying the first prong here, the prosecutor clearly called
to the jury's attention matters not presented during the trial.
He

first

attempted

to

elicit

information

about

communications with Barlow during cross-examination.18

his

direct

He asked

about the date and location of a pre-trial meeting, attended by

10

Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 (e) prohibits an
opponent from "alludting] to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue
except when testifying as witness, or state a personal opinion as
to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused . . . . "
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only by Mr. Barlow and Mr. Hunt, and then

suggested

that

meeting was an attempt to work out some type of settlement.
111-112.

The court sustained the objection.1'

TR.

He also commented

on matters "not supported by admissible evidence"
personal knowledge of facts in issue."

the

and "assert[edl

See Utah Rule of Pro.

10

Responsibility 3.4 (e).
The court's analysis of step two involves a consideration of
the circumstances of the case as a whole.

Span, 819 P.2d at 335.

Generally, when the evidence of defendant's guilt is strong, the
misconduct will

be ruled harmless.

Id. at

336

(prosecutorial

misconduct ruled harmless error, but case remanded back to trial
court

to

consider

prosecutor).

appropriate

disciplinary

action

However, when the evidence of guilt

court will closely scrutinize the conduct.

against

is weak, the

Span, 819 P.2d at 335.

11

Utah Rule of Evidence 410 makes statements made in the
course of plea negotiations inadmissible.
Mr. Barlow testified
that he had spoken with Mr. Hunt before trial telling him about his
medical problems. He did not discuss plea negations nor did he
speak about anything that Mr. Hunt said. He merely told the jury
that he spoke with one of the State's representatives about ongoing medical problems.
Mr. Barlow offered to describe the
additional matters discussed in the meeting but was limited by his
attorney: A [By Mr. Barlow]: Yeah. I told [Mr. Hunt] that I had a
real hard time—in that time there, and that I was un—able to pay,
you know, and do you want me to keep going, and tell what he told
me and back and forth.
Q: [by Mr. Mauro] No.
TR. 106 (3/2/92).
18

He told the jury that he personally knew of Mr. Barlow's
visits to the doctor but that "[Mr. Barlow's] never provided me
with any evidence of such. . . . " TR. 149 (3/2/92). These remarks
were improper because they called to the jury's attention matters
that were not introduced into evidence.
Additionally, those
comments were stated from the prosecutor's personal knowledge.
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The court will reverse when "there is a reasonable likelihood that
absent the errors a different result would have occurred."

Emmett,

184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.
Here, there was not compelling proof of Mr. Barlow's guilt.
No

state witness

rebutted

the medical

testimony

nor did

investigate Mr. Barlow's reason for the incomplete payments.

they
The

jurors "were probably influenced by" Mr. Hunt's comments when they
learned that Mr. Barlow never provided the medical reports to the
Attorney General's office before trial.

This statement suggested

to the jury that Mr. Barlow was fabricating the medical

records

because the prosecutor never saw them before trial. See Emmett, 184
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (improper comments which undermine the heart
of an accused's defense constitute reversible error).
The statements were also improper because Mr. Hunt asserted
personal knowledge of facts not

in evidence.

See Utah R. Pro.

Responsibility 3.4 (e); Span, 819 P.2d at 336 n. 4.

He improperly

undermin€*d

his

the

defendant's

testimony

by

stating

personal

knowledge of Mr. Barlow's medical condition.

This again implied

that

or

Mr. Barlow's

testimony was untruthful

trivial.

That

inadmissible evidence could cause the jury to conclude that Mr.
Barlow's claims were frivolous or insignificant.15

Finally, Mr.

Hunt was repeatedly admonished that the discussions of the pretrial meeting and his personal knowledge of Mr. Barlow's medical

iS

Mr. Hunt was not subject to cross-examination like the
other witnesses. Furthermore, no state witness had knowledge of
Mr. Barlow's medical condition.
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condition were

inadmissible.

TR.

115

(3/2/92);

TR.

149-50.'u

Nevertheless, he discussed the issue twice during closing argument/
once

during

rebuttal.

his
The

direct

closing

appellate

courts

argument
have

and

once

consistently

during
held

his
that

improper argument in a close case such as this is reversible error.
Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36; Troy, 688 P.2d at 487; Tarafa,
720

P.2d

at

1372.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

described

the

prosecutor's duty as follows:
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnest and vigor—indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.
Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (quoting Beraer v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Barlow asks

this court

to reverse his conviction

for

criminal non-support because the evidence was insufficient to the
support the conviction.

Mr. Barlow also asks the court to reverse

because the prosecutor's comments
zu

were improper

and

"probably"

Mr. Hunt also attempted to question Mr. Barlow about
arrearages which were previously ruled inadmissible and tried to
put on rebuttal evidence of prior arrearages. TR. 131, 162-164.
(3/2/92).
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influenced the verdict.

DATED this Yy

day of October, 1992.

Pm**^^"
RICHARD P. MAURO
Attorney for Appellant
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Art. I, § 12

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid
because it delegates to industrial commission
the power to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122
(1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of
third party, a stranger to employment, are not

limited to recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9
(1927).
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55
A.L.R.4th 1196.
False light invasion of privacy—defenses
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244.
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57
A.L.R.4th 404.
Libel or slander: defamation by statement
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520.
Defamation: designation as scab, 65
A.L.R.4th 1000.
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable.
70 A.L.R.4th 984.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Lav*
«=> 322, 324, 327, 328.

Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248.
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L Rev. 266.
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275.
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319.
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L
Rev. 47.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 129.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 613 to 617.
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§§ 1428 to 1437.
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.
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Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Gourt of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

20

76-7-104

CRIMINAL CODE

other prosecution of defendant for similar act
alleged to have been committed within same
period and within same jurisdiction; it was otherwise if adulterous act was alleged to have
been committed at particularly described
place. State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 P.
306 (1915).
,
, . A.
n . .
- R i s i n g and waiving objections.
Where defense to charge of rape amounted to
j
row
J? r J *
*jr
admission of adultery, defendant convicted of
latter could not object to .nformat.on as duplic
itous where he had interposed no special demurrer thereto and had waived preliminary
examination as to adultery, by failure to move
to quash duplicitous information charging both
ITolfv**™
n Q O ^ V* A n d e r t 0 n ' 6 9 U t a h
53, 252 P. 280 (1J26).
Issues.
In prosecution for adultery, whether prosecu-

trix was first defiled by defendant or some
other person was not germane to any issue in
case, and was, therefore, wholly immaterial
and should have been excluded as prejudicial
to defendant. State v. Hansen, 40 Utah 418,
122 P 375 (1912)
Persons liable.
C n m e of a d u l t e
did not necessarily involve
,
,
r .
criminal concurrence of
two persons, and may
,
,
.. , . .T x ,. r ., J
h
e b(
?Y ? " «>™»"f <* notwithstanding failure
° f f e ™ ' e *° c o ^ e n t ° l ^ { W i ^ f ? * *
do
*°_ S t a t e v- Wade > 6 6 U t a h 2 6 7 ' 2 4 1 R 8 3 8
(iy 0
^ 'Presumptions
In prosecution for adultery, it was presumed
t h a tfourteen-year-oldprosecutrix was unmarried, in absence of evidence to contrary. State
v. Wade, 66 Utah 267, 241 P. 838 (1925).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and
Fornication § 2.
C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adultery § 3.
A.L.R. — Validity of statute making adul-

tery and fornication criminal offenses, 41
A.L.R.3d 1338.
Key Numbers. — Adultery «=» 1.

76-7-104. Fornication.
(1) Any unmarried person who shall voluntarily engage in sexual intercourse with another is guilty of fornication.
(2) Fornication is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-7-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-104.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and
Fornication § 8.
C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Fornication § 2.
A.L.R. — Validity of statute making adul-

tery and fornication criminal offenses, 41
A.L.R.3d 1338.
Key Numbers. — Fornication «= 1.

PART 2
NONSUPPORT AND SALE OF CHILDREN
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport.
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse or children
under the age of sixteen years, he knowingly and without just cause fails to
provide for the support of the spouse or children when either is in needy
circumstances.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A
misdemeanor.
216

OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY

76-7-201

(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree under the following
circumstances:
(a) If the actor has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport,
whether in this state or any other state; or
(b) If the actor committed the offense while residing in another state.
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a
civil suit.
(5) In a prosecution under this section, it is no defense that the person to be
supported received necessary support from a source other than the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-7-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 21.
Cross-References. — Power of juvenile
court, § 78'3a-l et seq.

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
manently relieving father of his obligation to
support his child, except under the Adoption
Statute. Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d 136, 329
P.2d 878 (1958).

ANALYSIS

Defenses
Duty of father.
—In general.
—Relief from duty to support.
Failure of nonresident to support.
Just cause
Defenses.
Under former Penal Code provision on desertion of family it was no defense that destitute
children were relieved by charitable acts of
third persons. State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39,137 P.
629 (1913).
Duty of father.
—In general.
It was duty of father to support his minor
children if he was able to do so; and it was
cnmmal offense willfully to fail to support
one's minor children under age of sixteen
vears. Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co.,
55 Utah 566, 196 P. 556 (1921); Rockwood v.
Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925).
—Relief from duty to support
Court had no right to make final order per-

Failure of nonresident to support
Husband who was resident of another state
could be charged with offense of failure to provide in state in which he had permitted his
wife or children to live, or in which his misconduct had induced them to seek refuge. Osborn
v. Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949).
Just cause.
Under former § 76-15-1, it must have been
shown beyond reasonable doubt that children
were in destitute and necessitous circumstances, and father must have willfully neglected and refused, without just cause, to provide for children; if it appeared that current
and necessary expenses for himself and children exceeded his earnings, that he had not
remained idle when he could have obtained
employment, and had not wasted any part of
his earnings, he should have been acquitted.
State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 829 (1913).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband
and Wife § 329.
C.J.S. — 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 630.

A.L.R. — Homicide by withholding food,
clothing, or shelter, 61 A.L.R.3d 1207.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=» 303.
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R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
JEFFREY C. HUNT - 4988
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the plaintiff
120 North 200 West
Fourth Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980
Telephone: (801) 538-4660
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ELROY TAYLOR BARLOW,
DOB: 12/22/53
Defendant.

INFORMATION

911^W 7^ MS
Criminal No.
Bail $2,500

COUNT NO. I
CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT, a Class

"A" Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, on or between January 1, 1991 through
August 31, 1991, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 7, Section
201, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
Elroy Taylor Barlow, did knowingly and without just cause, fail
to provide for the support of his minor child(ren), to-wit: Rocky
02/02/80, and Nicholas 09/23/84, said child(ren) being in needy
circumstances:
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:

COUNT NO. I: Affiant, Lesli J. Hunter, Criminal Nonsupport Agent
for

the Attorney

General's

Office received

information

from

Kathleen Barlow, that the defendant, the natural parent of minor
child(ren), Rocky 02/02/80, and Nicholas 09/23/84, has failed to
provide

for

the

support

of

his

child(ren).

Defendant

is

obligated to pay $150.00 per month per child pursuant to support
order

c85-1381

for the support of his child(ren).

Between

January 1, 1991 through August 31, 1991 the defendant should have
paid $2,400.00, but has only paid $437.00 for the support of his
child (ren), and the child (ren) of the Defendant have been in
necessitous circumstances during the time period charged.

DATED this ^ 5 "

day of J^plZ

, 199 / .

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before
tfzl^ ~l ~"

199 ' .

ciRCOir. J O D ^ ^ ^ J

H

GaHm

This information is based on evidence otTfcfiHed from the
following witnesses:
Lesli J. Hunter
Kathleen Wayne

AUTHORIZED FOR PRESENTMENT
AND FILING:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JEFmEW0. HUgT
Assistant Attorney General
Defendant's Address:
Elroy Taylor Barlow
3165 West 3835 South, #F-101
Salt Lake City, Utah

~
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;

nmmwr
• J t.v V'J I-J a h- ii v; 2

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Le!:a County Utah

PHILLIP B. SHELL (3861)
DAY & BARNEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah
84107
Telephone: 262-6800

tk^Lly Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KATHLEEN M. BARLOW,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
ELROY TAYLOR BARLOW,
Defendant.

Civil No. D 85 1381

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on May 2, 1986/ the Honorable Raymond S.
Uno, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without a
jury.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and by her attorney,

Phillip B. Shell.

The Defendant did not appear.

The Court

received evidence on behalf of Plaintiff in support of her
complaint, and, being fully advised in the premises and having
rendered its decision herein by way of written Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and it appearing therefrom that Defendant's answer should be stricken for his failure to appear, as
well as submit a financial declaration, and that judgment should
be entered for the Plaintiff in accordance therewith and as
hereinafter set forth,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:

1.

That the Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce

dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Plaintiff and
Defendant.

Said Decree shall become final upon entry and is

awarded by reason of grounds found by the Court in accordance
with Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 30-3-1, to wit:

Defendant

caused Plaintiff to suffer great mental distress.
2.

That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control

of the two minor children born as issued of this marriage.
3.

That Defendant is awarded visitation rights once a week

for three hours at a mutually agreed upon place.
4.

The Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff $150.00 per

child per month for a total of $300.00 per month as and for child
support until said children reach the age of 18 years.
5.

Plaintiff is in need of support and Defendant is ordered

to pay Plaintiff $150.00 per month as and for alimony until she
remarries.
6.

The parties are awarded the personal property currently

in his or her possession.
7.

Each party is ordered to pay and hold the other harmless

for debts he or she has incurrd since their separation on
February 3, 1984.
8.

Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiff with an

automobile in reasonable running condition.

-2-

9.

Plaintiff is awarded her costs incurred in this matter.

DATED this / ^

day of May, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

-^Cdu>
RAYMOND S. UNO
DISTRICT JUDGE

ATTEST
H, DIXON KINDLEY

Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Elroy Taylor Barlow, Jr., Pro Se
930 West 1700 South
Salt Lake City,^tah 84102
on this

Jrh
'"'" day

otikll

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AM
OR.'G.W'AL DOCUMEN£<Jto FILE IN THE THPf,
DISTRICT COURTjjSAVJ/LAKE COUNTY, STAT2 Or
UTAH

DATE

-3-
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ADDENDUM E

1

we discussed.

I think the common scheme or plan or a much,

2

much narrower kind of thing, as in State v s , Morrell and

3

State vs. Shickles, in those sorts of cases that talk about it

4

And we discussed that in the hall, and I think that I'd

5

indicate that I t h i n k — I think that's what my position would

6

be.

7

THE COURT:

8

Now, do you have a motion to bring?

9

MR. MAURO:

10

to make, your Honor.

11

State vs. Troy, which talks about prosecutorial misconduct,

12

and it sets out a two-pronged case.

13

That takes care of that.

Yeah.

I have a motion for a mistrial

I think the case that I have would be

The first prong would be calling to the a t t e n t i o n —

14

calling to the attention of the jurors matters which would not

15

be justified in considering—the

16

in considering in determining their verdict.

17

particular circumstances of the case, were the jurors probably

18

influenced by.

juror would not be justified
And under the

The first, clearly, in the prosecutor f s argument

19
20

that he had had discussions with Mr. Barlow and his discussion

21

that the State had known about these medical records and had

22

through Mr. H u n t — n u m b e r one, made Mr. Hunt the witness, number

23

two, I think it's just clearly, clearly improper argument to

24

make to a jury, your Honor, that he somehow becomes a witness,

25

that he somehow has evidence and he's conveyed that to the

I
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1

jury without someone on the witness stand saying that.

2

Number two, were they probably influenced?

I think

3

I think w e need to look at what the jury's hearing.

4

that the State prosecutor has this evidence, that the State

5

prosecutor has known about this evidence, and no other

6

witness on the State prosecutor's team knows about this

7

evidence, but that the State prosecutor, not once, but twice,

8

both in direct closing argument and again on rebuttal, tells

9

the jury that M r . Barlow has had communications with h i n

10

That—

r e g a r d i n g — r e g a r d i n g these medical bills and other matters.

H

I 'think t h a t ' s , number o n e , clearly improper,

22

number two, it's an improper way to get it into evidence.

13

M r . Hunt should become a witness in this c a s e , if that is

24

t h e case, and I think it would be inadmissible under the

25

Rules of Evidence anyway, as some kind of a plea bargain; but

16

y e t / your H o n o r , were the jurors probably influenced?

17

certainly, I think they w e r e .

28

conclusion that w e can d r a w , in knowing that the State had

29

this e v i d e n c e .

Well,

I think that's a logical

20

I'd submit it.

2i

T H E COURT:

22

A n y rebuttal to t h a t , M r . Hunt?

23

M R . HUNT:

Thank y o u .

W e l l , just very briefly, your Honor.

24

T h e defendant is the one that testified, h i m s e l f , about o u r

25

conversations.

I

I w a s very c a r e f u l , especially after the
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1

Court's admonitions not to go into—although I don't think

2

that any discussion of a civil settlement on this case would

3

have been discussion of a plea bargain, as contemplated by the

4

case law, I was s t i l l — b e it as it may, I was still very

5

careful not to bring up discussions of the civil settlement

6

as well.

7

And I stated no more than what Mr. Barlow testified

8

to, and he himself opened that door.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

For the record, whether the

10

Court feels that what Mr. Hunt argued was proper or improper,

H

it was Mr. Barlow v/ho testified himself, on the stand, that he

12

had had discussions with Mr. Hunt at the office in regards to

13

his inability to pay, if I remember the testimony correctly.

24

I think that Mr. Hunt was cut off at a point that

15

wasn't prejudicial to the defendant, and I think the Court

16

also, in the course of the argument, gave the jury an oral

17

question or instruction in the fact that what Mr. Hunt was

18

saying was not testimony here today, he was not under oath,

19

and in one instance, that they were to disregard what was said,

20

The Court does not feel that what occurred arose to

21

the threshold point of intentional or even inadvertentness

22

or prosecutorial misconduct, and doesn't feel that a mistrial

23

would be appropriate under these circumstances.

24

All ricrht.

25

But your objection and your motion is

noted.

I
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Richard P. Mauro, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and that
four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to Attorneys for
Appellee, Jeffrey Hunt and John K. West, Assistant Utah Attorney
Generals, 120 North 200 West, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110-1980, this & ^dav of October, 1992.

6lCHARD P. MAURO
DELIVERED by Patti Adamson this 9th day of October, 1992.
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